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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is rapidly evolving. Are our current laws still relevant or
keeping up with this evolution? This Comment will explore how technology
has affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically as it relates to
digital currency such as bitcoin. As technology evolves, so do the methods
criminals use to commit crimes. In the last ten years, bitcoin has caught the
attention of criminals who appreciate the supposed anonymity it provides.1
Current case law allows government agents to search digital devices using
warrants, which appear to lack particularity.2 In the last decade, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged how case law involving the Fourth
Amendment may not be sufficient to handle searches in a digital age.3 While
criminals are becoming more sophisticated, the Supreme Court has taken a
significant step in protecting people against unreasonable searches and
seizures related to electronic devices where bitcoins are stored.4
There is nothing inherently wrong with using bitcoin.5 However,
considering its prominence in the dark web, courts should exercise care
when adding more stringent requirements to digital searches. There are two
competing interests: a person’s expectation of privacy and the government’s
interest in obtaining evidence against criminals who use bitcoin to engage in
crimes. Considering recent Fourth Amendment case law changes, I argue
how the third-party doctrine allows the government to investigate bitcoin
crimes while enabling it to obtain the necessary information to meet the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements.
Part II of this comment briefly provides information about what bitcoin
is, how to get it, how to store it, and its prevalence in crimes. Part III gives
a general overview of the Fourth Amendment. Part IV discusses how the
Fourth Amendment applies to bitcoin and how obtaining a search warrant
1. Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and
Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2014) (providing reasons why criminals prefer digital currencies
such as bitcoin).
2. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (requiring a warrant to search the digital
contents of a cell phone).
3. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing
concern the third-party doctrine is unsuitable in a digital age).
4. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (declining to extend the thirdparty doctrine to cell phone location records held by cell phone providers); Riley, 573 U.S. at 401
(requiring a warrant to search a cell phone even when seized incident to arrest).
5. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq
[https://perma.cc/9JG4-6UJA] (listing legitimate advantages of using bitcoin over traditional
currencies).
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of bitcoin wallets may be problematic, considering how the Supreme Court
recognizes and creates case law that affords digital devices greater privacy
protections. Considering this trend, Part IV analyzes how these changes
may make it difficult for government agents to meet the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements for a search
warrant. Part IV explores the legality of a government agent’s ability to
review Bitcoin’s public ledgers for potential criminal offenses and whether
a warrant is needed to search certain bitcoin information made public in
light of the third-party doctrine.
Part V discusses how new case law limiting the third-party doctrine is
inapplicable to certain Bitcoin searches and concludes with the need to
maintain the third-party doctrine.
II. THE RISE OF DIGITAL CURRENCY
A. What Is Bitcoin?
Bitcoin is a form of digital currency used in exchange for goods and
services.6 It is a digital payment system where people pay using digital
money, similar to people shopping online using a credit card.7 Unlike most
national currencies, no government or single administrator controls
bitcoin.8 Bitcoin is also not available in a printed form like other national
currencies such as the U.S. dollar.9 Bitcoins are entirely digital, represented
by a unique sequence of numbers and letters, and created using free
computer software.10 People analogize bitcoin mining to mining for
gold.11 Bitcoins are created by miners who use computers to solve complex
mathematical puzzles, which help create a bitcoin transaction record.12
Their reward for solving the problems and adding to the record is a newly
6. Id.
7. See What Is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
information/what-is-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/85MK-GH76] (explaining bitcoin can be used to pay
for goods or services electronically wherever bitcoin is accepted as a payment).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; John Bohannon, Why Criminals Can’t Hide Behind Bitcoin, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2016, 9:00
AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/why-criminals-cant-hide-behind-bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/XX6R-DSQZ].
11. How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
information/how-bitcoin-mining-works [https://perma.cc/5PQV-AEPK]; Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 5.
12. How Bitcoin Mining Works, supra note 11.
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issued bitcoin.13 Also, unlike how the Federal Reserve regulates the
production of new dollars, the Bitcoin system is set up only to create a total
of 21 million bitcoins.14
B. How Bitcoin Began
Bitcoin is the original type of cryptocurrency that uses cryptography to
secure its system.15 An unknown person, going by the pseudonym Satoshi
Nakamoto, developed Bitcoin in 2008.16 They described it as a “purely
peer-to-peer version of electronic cash [that] would allow online payments
to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a
financial institution.”17 The idea of cryptocurrency is that all Bitcoin users
may control it using mathematical calculations, and it eliminates the need to
go through intermediaries.18 Nakamoto believed the current method of
processing electronic payments through financial institutions using what he
describes as a “trust-based model” has inherent weaknesses, such as human
error and fraud.19 Nakamoto’s most significant concerns with using
intermediaries are that (1) they cannot effectively deal with fraud and
(2) financial transactions are reversible, which is a disadvantage to
merchants.20 He proposed Bitcoin as a solution to his concerns, a system
based on cryptographic proof rather than trust, shifting trust from financial
institutions and people to math and technology.21 Just as bitcoin miners
mine to create bitcoins, miners earn bitcoins for solving mathematical

13. Id.
14. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5; Luke Fortney, Bitcoin Mining, Explained,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin-mining.asp [https://perma.cc/Q3
ZK-W4PQ].
15. Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
c/cryptocurrency.asp [https://perma.cc/6AQ2-6F7E]. The meaning of the prefix crypto is
“concealed or secret.” Shobhit Seth, Explaining the Crypto in Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/explaining-crypto-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/HZR953FH]. (defining the prefix crypto and explaining “[c]ryptography is the mathematical and
computational practice of encoding and decoding data”).
16. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7 (stating no one knows Nakamoto’s true identity).
17. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 1 (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N2L-R99T].
18. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
19. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 1.
20. See id. (commenting on how merchants have to be cautious of customers and fear the risk
of having their transactions reversed due to fraud).
21. Id.
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equations that verify the bitcoin used in the transaction is not duplicated,
which prevents buyers from double-spending.22
C. Storing and Acquiring Bitcoin
Before owning a bitcoin, users have to decide where they will save
them.23 This storage is known as a “wallet.”24 Users have various storage
options available: they may use their computer, cell phone, hardware such
as a portable hard drive, or paper.25 The advantages of installing a software
wallet on a computer are that it is usually free, easy to set up, and allows
users to have control over their keys.26 Unfortunately, users must be careful
because hackers may have access to users’ wallets and bitcoins if hackers
gain access to their computers.27 Users may also use cloud wallets, which
allows users access to their bitcoins from any device.28 While cloud wallets
are convenient, this storage method also offers lower security because users
are entrusting a third party to secure their money.29 Mobile wallets allow
users to access their bitcoins from their mobile devices.30 Some users prefer
using hardware wallets to store their bitcoins because they are usually offline,
making them more secure and difficult to hack.31 The disadvantage of using
a hardware wallet or storing your bitcoin on a portable hard drive is that, if
the device is lost or stolen, you may lose those bitcoins too.32 Another
option for bitcoin users is to write down their bitcoin keys on paper.33
While paper is not hackable, it is easier to lose or destroy.34
After users create a digital wallet, they may begin acquiring bitcoins.
People can acquire bitcoins by accepting them “[a]s payment for goods and
services,” purchasing bitcoins from a specialized exchange such as Bitfinex,
22. Although mathematics is used to solve problems, most of mining is a guessing game. Miners
use computers to solve the problems and many miners work together, combining computing power to
solve the equations faster. Fortney, supra note 14.
23. How to Store Your Bitcoin, COINDESK (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/
information/how-to-store-your-bitcoins [https://perma.cc/ZUE7-ZC7F].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Coinbase, Bitstamp, or Poloniez, exchanging bitcoins with other bitcoin
users, or bitcoin mining.35 After acquiring bitcoin, users are issued a public
and private key that may be stored in the digital wallet.36 Users share their
public key—similar to an email address—with other users to transfer
bitcoins.37 Users use their private key—similar to a debit card PIN—to
authorize transactions.38
Unlike cash transactions, Bitcoin records every transaction on a public
ledger known as a blockchain.39 Everyone has access to the blockchain.40
Users can use the blockchain to verify the authenticity of a bitcoin payment
and ensure the payment is coming from the bitcoin’s rightful owner.41
There are several advantages of using bitcoin instead of traditional
currencies, the first being that it allows for payment freedom.42 People do
not have to worry about bank holidays, borders, or bureaucracy,43 allowing
users can exchange bitcoins at any time from any place in the world.44
Merchants benefit from accepting bitcoins because the transactions are
irreversible,45 and Bitcoin provides merchants better protection against
fraud.46 Buyers benefit from using bitcoin because there is stronger
protection against identity theft, and buyers do not have to worry about
erroneous merchant charges.47 Another advantage is that all bitcoin
transactions are available on a public ledger for users to verify
transactions.48 Also, bitcoin transactions and accounts are not linked to
real-world identities unless the user provides personal information.49 While

35. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5; How Can I Buy Bitcoin?, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-can-i-buy-bitcoins [https://perma.cc/PVT2-GCJX].
36. How Do Bitcoin Transactions Work?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/
how-do-bitcoin-transactions-work [https://perma.cc/3WYG-DMCF].
37. Prableen Bajpai, How to Buy Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/tech/
how-to-buy-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/ZB4J-KELK].
38. Id.
39. How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works [https://perma.
cc/76XC-Q6ND].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. How Does Bitcoin Work?, supra note 39.
49. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
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most people use bitcoin for legal purposes, criminals take advantage of
bitcoin’s anonymity to engage in illegal activities.50
D. Criminal Activity Involving Bitcoin
There is nothing inherently wrong with using bitcoin to transact with
others. Bitcoin provides legitimate benefits to individuals, businesses, and
organizations because it minimizes the risk of fraud by preventing doublespending or duplicating money.51 This benefit attracts criminals because it
reduces the risk of getting scammed.52 Another advantage is business
transactions may occur without tying a person’s personal information,
which helps prevent identity theft.53 Because of this, there is a perception
bitcoin allows for anonymity, which further attracts criminals.54 There are
thousands of cryptocurrencies, but bitcoin is the original and most common
form of cryptocurrency used in crimes involving cryptocurrency.55
Criminals use bitcoin for trafficking illegal goods, soliciting child
pornography, tax evasion, money laundering, funding terrorism, “and even
murder for hire.”56
One of the best examples of using bitcoin for illegal purposes is the story
of a black-market website known as Silk Road.57 Silk Road started as a
marketplace for people to buy and sell drugs.58 As such, people commonly
referred to Silk Road as the “[a]mazon.com” for drugs.59 Buyers and sellers
used bitcoin exclusively because of its perceived anonymity.60 Using bitcoin
and other encryption tools allowed users to engage in illegal activity without
50. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7.
51. Nikita Malik, How Criminals and Terrorists Use Cryptocurrency: And How To Stop It, FORBES
(Aug. 31, 2018, 10:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nikitamalik/2018/08/31/how-criminalsand-terrorists-use-cryptocurrency-and-how-to-stop-it/#2cf57f763990 [https://perma.cc/T29F-7A
VB].
52. Id.
53. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
54. Malik, supra note 51.
55. Jen Wieczner, Bitcoin Accounts for 95% of Cryptocurrency Crimes, Says Analyst, FORTUNE
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/04/24/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-crime [https://perma.cc/
E9AR-GLXX].
56. Stephen Small, Comment, Bitcoin: The Napster of Currency, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 581, 583
(2015) (describing how bitcoin is used for illegal purposes).
57. See Larry McIntyre, Comment, Cyber-Takings: The War on Crime Moves into the Cloud, 14 PITT.
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 333, 342–43 (2014) (discussing the origins of Silk Road).
58. Id. at 342–43.
59. Id. at 342.
60. Id. at 343.
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the fear of getting caught.61 It took two years for the government to find
the website owner, and that was only because the owner inadvertently
exposed his identity.62 In the last few years, more cases involving Bitcoin
have emerged, and in almost every case, the defendant argued the
government violated the Fourth Amendment.63
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW
The United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.64

Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee absolute
protection against all searches—only unreasonable ones.65 Historically, the
Fourth Amendment’s protection was limited to physical intrusions into
constitutionally protected areas such as homes.66 Early interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment required a “trespass” analysis.67 Since Katz v. United
States,68 cases involving the Fourth Amendment have adopted
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.69 Katz
introduced the notion the Fourth Amendment protects people and not
places,70 and this analysis predominated for decades.71 Nevertheless, the
trespass analysis is still alive.72 In recent years, the Court has, on occasion,
61. What Is Bitcoin?, supra note 7.
62. McIntyre, supra note 57, at 343.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 98 (2d Cir. 2017) (arguing the government
violated the defendant’s privacy interest by monitoring his IP address traffic).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“For ‘what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960))).
66. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (concluding the Fourth Amendment
was not violated when the government tapped a person’s telephone conversations because there was
no physical trespass onto his property), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967).
67. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66 (exemplifying a trespass analysis).
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
70. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
71. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406.
72. Id. at 406–07.
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relied on a trespass analysis.73 Thus, the government can implicate a
person’s Fourth Amendment right in two ways: (1) a search by a
governmental agent of an area where a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy; or (2) a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area
such as a home.74
To determine whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment, courts use a subjective and objective test.75
The defendant must establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in
the place searched, and the subjective expectation must be one society
would accept as reasonable.76 If the person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, a police officer needs a warrant to search the area unless the search
satisfies one of the warrant requirement exceptions.77 A neutral and
detached magistrate judge issues the warrant after the officer has proven
probable cause.78 If there is no trespass or reasonable expectation of
privacy, then a search warrant is not needed.
Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect information a person
shares with third parties.79 A person does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for information he shares with others.80 The general rule is if
someone provides information to a third party, that person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and a government agent may obtain that
information from third parties without a warrant.81 This belief is true even
if someone believed the information shared with a third party would remain
private.82 In Hoffa v. United States,83 the Supreme Court held the
Fourth Amendment does not protect information shared with others
because of a person’s “misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
73. Id. at 404–05.
74. See id. at 406–07 (holding the Fourth Amendment protects against government trespass);
see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (explaining the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn solely on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosed structure).
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 361–62.
78. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109–10 (1965).
79. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442–44 (1976).
80. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (explaining there is not a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sound of one’s voice).
81. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445–46 (concluding Defendant did not have a Fourth Amendment
interest to dispute the subpoena of his bank records).
82. Id. at 443.
83. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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confides” will not share that information with someone else.84 This idea is
one of the concepts behind the third-party doctrine.85
The consequence of not having the third-party doctrine is that if a
government agent successfully obtained evidence against a defendant
through an unlawful search, such evidence might be subject to the
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule prevents the government from
presenting evidence obtained through an unlawful search.86 Its purpose is
to deter government agents from violating a person’s Fourth Amendment
right by conducting an unlawful search.87 Stricter laws may hinder the
government’s ability to find criminals or obtain evidence. If a court deems
the government’s search unlawful, it is possible the government is prevented
from presenting such crucial evidence.88
IV. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO BITCOIN
Bitcoin searches can occur in at least three different ways.89 A
government agent can search a person’s digital wallet,90 the Bitcoin public
ledger,91 or subpoena records from third-party exchanges who assist in the
buying, selling, and managing of cryptocurrency. The Fourth Amendment
is implicated differently in each scenario.

84. Id. at 302.
85. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (“The third-party doctrine partly
stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly
shared with another.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 440 (stating a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not
implicated unless the government has intruded into one’s “zone of privacy” and information shared
with third parties is not private).
86. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating the exclusionary rule is “an essential
part of the right to privacy” the Fourth Amendment is trying to protect); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) (explaining those who execute the criminal laws to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful search and seizures “should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts”).
87. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule’s prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
88. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).
89. Will Yakowicz, Startups Helping the FBI Catch Bitcoin Criminals, INC. (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/startups-law-enforcement-agencies-catch-criminals-who-use-cr
yptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/3RBF-YJEC].
90. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100–01 (explaining how a search warrant may be used to search a hard
drive for bitcoin wallet files).
91. See Yakowicz, supra note 89 (discussing how startup companies are helping law enforcement
by creating forensic software which identifies patterns in detecting crimes and tracing the transactions
to the end user).
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A. Searching Bitcoin Wallets and the Limitations of Cell Phones
Bitcoin raises several Fourth Amendment search issues because of how
people obtain and store the cryptocurrency.92 Federal courts have issued
opinions that demonstrate a trend toward affording more protection to the
information contained in electronic devices.93 As technology evolves,
courts are slowly beginning to adapt to that change. The nature of modern
technology, which holds so much data and personal information, has caused
the courts to think more broadly about what a protected interest is and more
narrowly about the third-party doctrine exception.94
For example, the Court—applying Katz—has long permitted officers to
search persons incident to a lawful arrest so that they may protect
themselves or preserve evidence of the crime.95 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court recognized the need to adapt to the advancement of technology,
especially as it relates to storage, surveillance, and communication.96 In
Chimel v. California,97 the Supreme Court held when an officer arrests a
person, the officer may search the person incident to a lawful arrest without
a warrant to protect themselves or preserve evidence of a crime.98 Forty-

92. See Jonathan Lane, Note, Bitcoin, Silk Road, and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency
Regulation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 540 (2014) (“As applied to Bitcoin, perhaps the most important
Fourth Amendment issue is law enforcement’s ability to search and/or seize the digital currency and
the personal computers and devices used for its storage and transfer.”).
93. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (acknowledging how gaining
access to a person’s cell phone location allows the government to take a peek into the intimate details
of a person’s life); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding a warrant is needed to search
data information on a cell phone seized from an arrestee due to the privacy concerns implicated
because of the immense amount of information contained inside them); United States v. Blood, 429 F.
App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A laptop computer is entitled to the same Fourth Amendment
protection as other closed containers and personal effects.”); Lane, supra note 92 (finding a “trend in
federal court rulings suggest[ing]” electronic devices are afforded the same Fourth Amendment
protection as containers).
94. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (“This sort of digital data—personal [cellphone-cite] location
information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents.”).
95. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.”).
96. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (recognizing the importance of preserving a person’s Fourth
Amendment right to privacy against the government as technology evolves); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
97. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
98. Id. at 762–63.
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five years later, the Supreme Court limited the holding by requiring
government agents to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone.99
In Riley v. California,100 the Court ruled that officers may only examine a
cell phone’s physical characteristics with a search warrant, but not the
information contained inside it.101 The Court reasoned that such a search
implicates significant privacy concerns.102 While cell phones are like any
container that might contain evidence of a crime, they pose a special danger
compared to other containers, such as a cigarette pack, where you may find
evidence of a crime, or a bag, which may contain a weapon.103 The term
“cell phone” is misleading because cell phones are more than just containers
or devices used to text and talk.104 Cell phones are essentially
minicomputers, which “could easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions,
maps, or newspapers.”105 Before cell phones came around, people were
not carrying every piece of personal information around with them.106
Today, law enforcement can retrace a person’s life based on photos, texts,
search, and location history contained in a phone.107 While current
Supreme Court cases involve the use of cell phone searches and their privacy
concerns, the same privacy concerns apply to computers because of their
“immense storage capacity,” GPS capability, and Internet access.108
Most people store bitcoins in electronic devices such as cell phones,
computers, the cloud, or offline storage devices. Because of the vast amount
of information contained in these types of electronic devices, searching
these devices for bitcoin information can be problematic. Computers, cell
phones, and digital storage devices include more than just a bitcoin digital
wallet; they hold a significant amount of private information, implicating
99. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
100. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
101. Id. at 387.
102. Id. at 394.
103. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221–23 (1973) (describing an instance where
an officer pulled over a person for driving with a revoked license, arrested him, searched his pocket,
and found a cigarette pack which contained capsules of heroin).
104. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 395.
107. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218, 2220 (2018) (explaining how the
government can use historical cell-site location information to retrace a person’s every move).
108. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–94 (analogizing cell phones to minicomputers and discussing how
the ability to store an immense amount of data in a single device brings forward privacy issues that
searches of other physical items do not).
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privacy concerns grounded in the Fourth Amendment.109 Because of these
concerns, coupled with the ease of getting a warrant, a warrant is required
in most cases before searching through a digital device’s contents.
A valid search warrant must meet three requirements. First, the issuing
magistrate must be detached and neutral.110 Second, the warrant must be
based on probable cause using a totality of the circumstances analysis with
information provided to the magistrate judge by a government agent.111
Third, the warrant must describe the property or place to be searched with
particularity.112
Establishing probable cause to search digital storage devices for bitcoin
evidence is problematic.113 Considering how long it takes for government
agents to decipher bitcoin information, it may be difficult for the agents to
develop probable cause before someone transfers the bitcoins elsewhere.114
When issuing a warrant, a “magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”115 Analytical tools
allow government agents to find suspicious patterns within the Bitcoin
blockchain.116 Although agents may see the transactions and the associated
Bitcoin public addresses used in the exchange, discovering the identity of
the owner is difficult because agents lack the IP address needed to trace the
transaction back to the person or digital device.117 The Bitcoin system is
designed to hide IP addresses from their corresponding transactions.118
The challenge with establishing probable cause is that bitcoins may change
hands instantaneously.119 Thus, by the time the government identifies a
user, the bitcoin investigated may no longer belong to that user. This makes
it difficult for the government agent to prove probable cause.120

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 393.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
Lane, supra note 92, at 540–43.
Id.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
Yakowicz, supra note 89.
Bohannon, supra note 10.
Id.
Lane, supra note 92, at 542.
Id.
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Obtaining a warrant to search a cell phone, computer, or cloud storage
may also prove to be somewhat challenging because of the particularity
requirement. The particularity requirement to obtain a warrant is a
significant safeguard against unreasonable search and seizure; it prevents the
government from having the ability to obtain a general warrant to search
without limitation.121 The framers of the U.S. Constitution deliberately
inserted the particularity safeguard in response to the abuse of warrants in
England against the colonists, which allowed English officers to search at
will.122 The prevention of general searches is not the only purpose of the
particularity requirement.123 The particularity requirement also lets an
individual know that an officer’s search is lawful, indicates what is being
seized, and states the scope of the search.124 Warrants protect people’s
right to privacy.
A warrant must meet three requirements to adhere to the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. First, the warrant must list the
specific offense the government agent believes they have probable cause
for.125 Second, a warrant must describe “the place to be searched.”126
Third, the warrant must describe “the persons or things to be seized.”127
Because of the amount of information in electronic devices containing
bitcoin wallets, it may be challenging to meet the particularity
requirement.128 Digital device searches are significantly different from
searches of other physical items.129 Unlike a search of physical evidence
such as a purse or drawers, a search for information contained in an

121. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–85 (1980) (“It is familiar history that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the
immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”).
122. Id. at 608 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004).
124. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (citing Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2017) (illustrating how the
defendant deliberately hid files using labels such as “mbsobzvkhwx4hmjt” which makes it difficult for
government agents to find using key words or cursorily reviews).
129. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”).
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electronic device usually requires an officer to take the entire device offsite
to review the information inside.130
Despite the concerns about warrants meeting the particularity
requirement, courts continue to allow government agents to search
electronic devices even when the warrant only describes the device, type of
device, or place where the device may be found.131 The current case law
on digital searches is “deferential to law enforcement.”132 The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize the need for government agents to
seize computers and take them offsite to search, as searching onsite is
impracticable for law enforcement agents.133
For example, in United States v. Ulbricht,134 the Second Circuit investigated
the issue regarding whether the use of a warrant to search a laptop for
evidence relating to the dark web website, Silk Road, and the resulting
bitcoin wallet transactions met the particularity requirement.135 The
defendant argued the warrant to search and seize his laptop “violated the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.”136 The Second Circuit
acknowledged how a search of a computer hard drive provides government
agents with a trove of sensitive information.137 The court went further to
admit: “Where . . . the property to be searched is a computer hard drive, the
particularity requirement assumes even greater importance.”138 Legal
scholars and courts analogize computer hard drives to residences because
of the amount of private information contained inside.139 Notwithstanding
this acknowledgment, the Second Circuit held the search for bitcoin
evidence in a laptop was lawful because a warrant does not need to describe

130. James T. Stinsman, Comment, Computer Seizures and Searches: Rethinking the Applicability of the
Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital
Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2015).
131. Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices,
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 214–15 (2018).
132. Kerr, supra note 130, at 6.
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B); Kerr, supra note 130, at 6.
134. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017).
135. See id. (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement related to warrants
to search technology).
136. Id. at 99.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013)).
139. See Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446 (“[A]dvances in technology and the centrality of computers in
the lives of average people have rendered the computer hard drive akin to a residence in terms of the
scope and quantity of private information it may contain.”).
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the items searched perfectly.140 The court reasoned a broad warrant does
not automatically mean the warrant lacks particularity.141
The current case law seems to allow government agents to obtain broad
warrants to search through digital devices, “so long as law enforcement
agents have done the best that could reasonably be expected under the
circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasonable
investigation could be expected to cover, and have insured that all those
facts were included in the warrant.”142 In light of Carpenter v. United
States143 and Riley (which are not warrant cases), it seems that deference to
government agents may diminish.144 Even in Ulbricht, the Second Circuit
conceded that a different case than the one in front of them might require
them to add limitations to digital searches to ensure warrants for digital
searches meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.145
Some courts are urging judges to examine search warrants of digital
devices more carefully.146 In People v. Covlin,147 the New York Supreme
Court found two warrants to search through digital devices lacked
particularity.148 The New York Supreme Court found one warrant lacked
particularity because it allowed law enforcement to search the defendant’s
home for any type of electronic or paper record without limitation.149 The
court found the other warrant lacked particularity because it granted the

140. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 100.
141. Id.
142. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446).
143. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
144. See id. at 2218 (illustrating how cell phone technology has changed decades old case law
relating to searches); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94 (2014) (describing how cell phones
implicate greater privacy concerns than other physical searches). Carpenter and Riley are not specifically
about what is required when a warrant is obtained; however, their reasoning may lead courts to impose
stricter requirements on officers seeking warrants.
145. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 104.
146. See People v. Covlin, 70 N.Y.S.3d 342, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (emphasizing the
importance of courts affording proper deference to the process, so as not to defeat search warrants);
Alyssa C. Goldrich, A Step in the Right Direction: Judge Suppresses Evidence Seized in Murder Case Due to
Overbroad Computer Search Warrants, GDB LAW (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.gdblaw.com/
overboard-computer-search-warrants [https://perma.cc/BR6S-EGTG] (“[U]ntil the law can catch up
to rapid technological innovations in society, search warrants seeking to access a defendants digital data
must be scrutinized with the utmost diligence in order to effectively preserve one’s Constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
147. Covlin, 70 N.Y.S.3d at 347–49.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 347–48.
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search of a cell phone for any stored electronic information.150 While this
is a major win for advocates of protecting privacy, it is particularly
worrisome for government agents who need access to a person’s digital and
paper records to find bitcoin transactions. Again, bitcoin keys can be stored
digitally inside physical storage devices, the cloud, or on paper.
Bitcoin storage wallets, like other digital evidence, differ substantially
from other forms of physical evidence.151 While it is true that digital
storage devices contain an immense amount of private information, it is also
true that government agents will not always know where bitcoin information
is stored. Criminals may conceal bitcoin information within a large volume
of other digital information, essentially making the bitcoin information a
needle in a haystack. Unfortunately, this means searching for evidence
relating to bitcoin may inevitably lead to sorting through irrelevant private
information. Because a warrant allows the agent to search the entire wallet
in its investigation of a single bitcoin, anything the government finds in that
wallet could be fair game through the “plain view” doctrine.152 The plain
view doctrine is an exception to the general rule requiring a warrant to search
objects.153 The Supreme Court reasons “[i]f an article is already in plain
view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of
privacy.”154
A recent case from a Michigan district court involving bitcoin helps
illustrate this issue. In United States v. Stetkiw,155 Homeland Security
Investigations was initially investigating Stetkiw for violations related to

150. Id. at 348–49.
151. See Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’ Revolt,
68 EMORY L.J. 49, 57–58 (2018) (differentiating digital evidence from other forms of evidence because
digital data is easier to conceal than other physical evidence, which can be hidden away in physical areas
or containers).
152. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135–37 (1990) (holding government agents may
conduct a warrantless seizure as long as they are lawfully on the premises, discover evidence of a crime
that is in plain view, and have probable cause to believe the property is evidence of a crime); Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323–26 (1987) (explaining how the plain view doctrine was inapplicable when
a police officer, while investigating a shooting inside an apartment, moved two stereos to see their
serial numbers because he had a reasonable suspicion the stereos were stolen, but lacked the necessary
probable cause); Yuval Simchi-Levi, Search Warrants in the Digital Age, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 995, 1005
(2019) (discussing how the majority of circuit courts hold the plain view doctrine is applicable to
electronic evidence as long the search for digital evidence is reasonably needed based on what is in the
search warrant).
153. Horton, 496 U.S. at 133.
154. Id. (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325).
155. United States v. Stetkiw, No. 18-20579, 2019 WL 2866516 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 2019).
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running an unlicensed bitcoin exchange service.156 The government had a
warrant to search through Stetkiw’s computer data and image files.157
While searching through the image files, the government agent found child
pornography.158 After discovering the image, the agent immediately
stopped the search and obtained another search warrant for child
pornography and subsequently found more images.159
Stetkiw’s attorneys then filed a motion to suppress the child pornography
evidence found while searching the computer for bitcoin evidence.160 His
lawyers argued the search warrant lacked particularity, and a search of
computer images was unrelated to uncovering bitcoin evidence.161 The
court held the warrant was particular because it identified all forms of
storage, including images, and the agent who searched the computer
justified the search of pictures because people may hide bitcoin information
in various locations inside the computer.162 The government agent who
searched the computer also testified he needed to look through the image
files for bitcoin evidence because the image files may contain bitcoin QR
codes, the information needed to recover a bitcoin wallet, and wallet
passwords.163
The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence because the agent
had probable cause to search the computer image files for bitcoin evidence,
and the child pornography photo was in plain view.164 Before concluding
the opinion, the judge expressed concern about the agent’s testimony during
the evidentiary hearing regarding the computer search.165 The agent stated,
“[t]here were no practical limitations to what could be searched for on
Stetkiw’s computer.”166 To the judge, this statement sounded like a general
warrant.167 Nevertheless, while the judge ruled the search constitutional,
they recommend that for the future, the magistrate judge issuing a warrant
should conduct an ex ante review of the search procedures to assist courts
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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and agents in conducting searches that do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.168
The Stetkiw case demonstrated how a computer search allowed the
government to discover evidence against “the bad guys.” But what about
the good guys? While this is a win for the government agents combating
crime and protecting society against people who illegally possess child
pornography, this example is not illustrative of every potential circumstance.
Would innocent people feel comfortable with a government agent searching
through their private photos? What if the images of child pornography did
not belong to Stetkiw but someone else instead? What if someone planted
the images inside the computer through a virus?169 These questions are
probably far-fetched ideas in Stetkiw’s case but could be a viable defense in
other circumstances. The level of anonymity bitcoin provides makes it
difficult for agents to know where exactly bitcoin is stored and who it
belongs to, which requires government agents to have some reasonable
flexibility in conducting searches.
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has issued three significant
opinions relating to searches of digital storage devices.170 These cases
demonstrate the Court is now seriously confronting the applicability of
Fourth Amendment case law in a more technological society. They also
demonstrate how the Court is imposing significant limitations on searches
and prioritizing the people’s right to privacy. Considering this trend, it
appears as though the Court or Congress may impose a stricter particularity
requirement. With this in mind, we must find other avenues in which
government agents can obtain bitcoin evidence to combat crimes without
violating a person’s right to privacy.

168. Id. at *4–5.
169. See generally Simchi-Levi, supra note 152, at 1002 (explaining how the Second Circuit held
government agents may require a search of an entire electronic device to refute a defendant’s claim
that a hacker placed files into a person’s computer thorough a hacking or virus).
170. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (exemplifying how technology
affects third-party doctrine caselaw); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding a warrant is
needed to search data information on a cell phone seized from an arrestee because a cell phone is not
a weapon and people have reasonable expectation that the information contained in their cell phones
is private); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (ruling the government must obtain a
warrant before installing a GPS device on someone’s vehicle because monitoring a vehicle’s every move
is a search).
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B. Bitcoin’s Public Ledger and a Person’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Government agents may have better luck searching and analyzing
Bitcoin’s blockchain because people do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy to information provided directly and indirectly on Bitcoin’s
blockchain. Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect
information a person knowingly shares with the public.171 The Fourth
Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches when a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy of the information or place searched.172
Courts apply a two-part inquiry to determine whether an expectation of
privacy is reasonable.173 Courts first assess whether a person subjectively
believes that she has an expectation of privacy.174 Secondly, courts evaluate
whether society would objectively recognize the expectation of privacy as
reasonable.175 A person’s expectation of privacy must also be legitimate.176
A legitimate expectation of privacy does not mean that a person had a
subjective belief she would not be discovered.177
The first step in determining whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy is to assess whether a person has a subjective
expectation of privacy when he uses bitcoin, knowing the transaction is
displayed permanently in Bitcoin’s blockchain. There are several reasons
why a person should not have a subjective expectation of privacy.
Satoshi Nakamoto describes bitcoin as a “peer-to-peer version of
electronic cash,” which allows people to send an electronic payment to other
parties without having an intermediary such as a bank facilitating the
process.178 To prevent people from double-spending bitcoin, miners use
computers to solve mathematical problems that confirm the authenticity of
the transactions and record the transactions onto a permanent record

171. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
172. Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018); Jones, 565 U.S. at 406; United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
173. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
177. See id. at 143 n.12 (“A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may
have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes
as ‘legitimate.’”).
178. Nakamoto, supra note 17.
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known as the blockchain or public ledger.179 As a reward for honest work,
the system creates new bitcoin and issues bitcoins to the miners.180
Everyone who has Internet access may search and see the bitcoin public
ledger at any time.181 There is a record of every Bitcoin transaction on the
Bitcoin blockchain. The blockchain is named as such because each digital
transaction is one of several transactions contained inside a “block.”182
Miners then record each block on the “chain,” which is its shared public
ledger.183 Each transaction tells viewers the time, date, amount spent, and
address involved in the transaction.184 What the block might not tell you
is the identity of the person who sent or received the bitcoin.185 Thus,
people are under the misconception that bitcoin is entirely anonymous,
keeping their transactions free from unauthorized intrusion.186 This
perception is not accurate.
Bitcoin’s website acknowledges the
misperception of it being an anonymous payment system.187 Bitcoin prides
itself as being “the most transparent payment . . . in the world.”188 Bitcoin
is inherently not private because it is information a person knowingly shares
with the public.189
Satoshi Nakamoto discussed privacy in his bitcoin paper and explained
how traditional banking systems could provide a certain level of privacy by
limiting the amount of information provided to other parties. Bitcoin, on
the other hand, does not allow for this level of privacy because of the
necessity to record all transactions on the blockchain to help people verify
the authenticity of each bitcoin transaction.190 Nakamoto does address
how a certain level of privacy can be achieved by “keeping public keys
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. I—a person who does not own any bitcoin—did a quick google search for “Bitcoin
Blockchain” and was directed to a website that shows me the bitcoin and ethereum, another form of
cryptocurrency, blockchain. Fortney, supra note 14.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bohannon, supra note 10.
186. Id. (“‘It’s totally anonymous,’ was how one commenter put it in Bitcoin’s forums in
June 2013. ‘The FBI does not have a prayer of a chance of finding out who is who.’”).
187. Protect Your Privacy, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy [https://per
ma.cc/TG3T-DDDA].
188. Id.
189. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
190. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 6.
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anonymous.”191 Bitcoin’s website explicitly states that all of its transactions
are “public, traceable, and permanently stored in the Bitcoin network.”192
The website also acknowledges once someone uses a bitcoin, it is forever
“tainted by the history of all transactions ever involved with.”193 Further,
Bitcoin also recognizes how someone may trace a bitcoin address to a
specific user and encourages users to take precautions in protecting their
privacy.194
These facts suggest there is no reasonable expectation of privacy because
of the very idea the blockchain contains a public record of all bitcoin
transactions that anyone with an Internet connection can access without
accessing the individual’s computer.195 The core of Bitcoin’s infrastructure
requires a permanent and public record so that others may verify the
authenticity of the transactions.196 While a person’s real name might not
appear on the blockchain, there are other methods in which others can link
a person to a specific bitcoin.197 For example, if a person exchanges his
bitcoin address in-person to a merchant who accepts bitcoins as a payment,
the merchant now knows the individual’s real identity.198
Moreover, people should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
since Bitcoin warns its users of the ability for someone “to listen for
transactions’ relays and log their IP addresses.”199 Most federal circuit
courts hold a person does not have a reasonable subjective expectation of
privacy for IP address information.200 IP addresses may reveal a person’s
191. Id.
192. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.
193. Id.
194. Id. (“As the block chain is permanent, it’s important to note that something not traceable
currently may become trivial to trace in the future.”).
195. See Eric Wall, Privacy and Cryptocurrency, Part I: How Private is Bitcoin?, MEDIUM (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://medium.com/human-rights-foundation-hrf/privacy-and-cryptocurrency-part-i-how-privateis-bitcoin-e3a4071f8fff [https://perma.cc/A3DU-P49P] (explaining Bitcoin is only semi-private).
196. Nakamoto, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining how the only way the system can prevent others
from double-spending bitcoins is by requiring all Bitcoin transactions are publicly recorded).
197. Wall, supra note 195.
198. Id.
199. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.
200. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2017) (joining other circuit courts
in holding a warrant is not required to for the government to collect IP addresses because a person
does not have a “legitimate privacy interest” in IP address information); United States v. Wheelock,
772 F.3d 825, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Wheelock cannot claim a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy in
[the] government’s acquisition of his subscriber information, including his IP address and name from
third-party service providers.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Suing, 712 F.3d 1209,
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location and Internet Service Provider (ISP), which in turn may reveal a
person’s identity.201 There are even geolocation IP databases that allow
you to determine a person’s approximate location using his IP address.202
People may expose their identities even when connected to another person’s
Wi-Fi network or a public Wi-Fi network because of the person’s browser
history or stored cookies on a personal computer.203
Furthermore, even if a person believes he has a reasonable expectation of
privacy for information made public on the blockchain, it is not one society
may accept or recognize as a reasonable expectation of privacy. Bitcoin is a
“decentralized peer-to-peer payment network that is powered by its
users.”204 The very nature of Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network and structure
requires that transactions are public,205 which leaves “extensive public
records.”206 Regarding peer-to-peer networks, a person who makes a
“decision to install and use file-sharing software [on his computer],” which
opens “his computer to anyone else with the same freely available program,”
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.207 The same conclusion
applies to a person’s expectation of privacy concerning bitcoin transactions
because a person who knowingly and voluntarily uses bitcoin as a payment
method cannot expect information that is recorded permanently on the
blockchain, for others to see and verify, to be private.208 Bitcoin’s
1213 (8th Cir. 2013))); United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding an
expectation of privacy of IP address information is unreasonable (citing United States v. Perrine,
518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008)
(analogizing Internet users to telephone users, stating neither has a reasonable expectation of privacy
because Internet users know their “IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party
equipment” and are instead “voluntarily turned over” to ISPs to direct the communication).
201. Wall, supra note 195.
202. Id. (providing an example of a website which provides a rough approximate location of a
user using an IP address); Inception, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en
[https://perma.cc/HSC3-REMA] (stating how mapping a person’s location using an IP address is
becoming increasingly precise).
203. Wall, supra note 195 (providing an example of how a person’s Dropbox application will
associate a person’s account with the IP address used whenever connected to the Internet as soon as
the laptop is turned on).
204. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
205. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.
206. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
207. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008).
208. See United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747–48 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding a person does
not have an expectation of privacy when he “widely and voluntarily” disseminates information through
the ordinary use of peer-to-peer software); Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127 (describing a case where a
government agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he used LimeWire, a peer-to-peer
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blockchain is not a peer-to-peer software where users share files, but it is a
peer-to-peer network where other users confirm other user transactions.
On the other hand, a person may argue he has a reasonable expectation
of privacy of his identity because there is a difference between a permanent
record of a bitcoin transaction and a record of his identity. While a person
may recognize his transactions are logged permanently on the blockchain
public ledger, he may still maintain the subjective expectation that this
identity or IP addresses would remain concealed because bitcoin
information on the blockchain does not contain personally identifiable
information. Some users take extra precaution by utilizing tools to hide their
identity or IP address.209 In Katz, the Supreme Court held the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information a person knowingly shares with
the public.210 However, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”211 In Katz,
the Court held that a defendant did not lose his Fourth Amendment
protection merely because he used a public telephone booth.212 By closing
the telephone booth door, the defendant expected his telephone
conversation was private.213
While many bitcoin users might not take steps in protecting their privacy,
some sophisticated users deliberately try and protect their personal
information.214 Like in Katz, if people take precautions in preventing
exposure of their real-life identity by using tools that mask their IP
addresses, people should not lose their expectation of privacy merely
because their transaction is public.215 Bitcoin encourages users to protect
their privacy by informing them only to use a specific bitcoin address once,
not sharing their addresses, and using tools that make tracing IP addresses
software, to access a defendant’s computer to find child pornography files because the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he used the software).
209. United States v. Brown, 857 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing how Tor, a tool used
to mask one’s IP address, “routes online communications through anonymizing proxy computers” to
conceal the user’s true identity).
210. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 152 (“One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”).
213. Id.
214. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2017) (illustrating how Ulbricht used
Tor, a tool used to make it difficult for people to trace Internet traffic).
215. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.”).
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difficult.216 Under current case law, any attempt a person may make to
conceal IP address information is possibly futile because a person cannot
expect privacy when it comes to IP address information.217
For example, bitcoin users use a popular tool to mask a person’s IP
address: Tor.218 Tor is a free software used to block third-party trackers
from accessing a person’s Internet cookies, guard against other people who
try and monitor someone’s Internet usage, and provide Internet data traffic
encryption.219 Despite using this tool, many courts hold there is still no
reasonable expectation of privacy in protecting one’s IP address.220 In
United States v. Matish,221 the court found a person’s subjective expectation
of privacy is not objectively reasonable because Tor requires Internet users
to provide their real IP address.222 By providing his IP address to a third
party, the Tor user lost his expectation of privacy.223 For some courts, this
finding is seemingly limited to the collection of IP addresses and does not
allow government agents to access the contents of one’s computer without
a warrant.224 Nevertheless, if the government can discover an IP address
without searching unlawfully through a person’s computer, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Moreover, the government does not violate a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights when an agent uses computer software to perform a

216. Protect Your Privacy, supra note 187.
217. See Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 97–98 (holding collecting IP addresses is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment, even when using tools such as Tor to conceal identities).
218. David Hollerith, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous and Tor Users Are Forgetting This, BITCOIN MAG.
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-is-not-anonymous-and-tor-users-areforgetting-this [https://perma.cc/4G2Z-T6RP]; see also Andy Greenberg, The Grand Tor: How To Go
Anonymous Online, WIRED (Dec. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-grand-tor
[https://perma.cc/67HP-HDXW] (indicating how millions of Internet users utilize Tor for the closest
thing to anonymity on the Internet).
219. Tor: Overview, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https://
perma.cc/BB2V-35FX]; Greenberg, supra note 218.
220. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 615 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Even an Internet user
who employs the Tor network in an attempt to mask his or her IP address lacks a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her IP address.”).
221. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016).
222. Id. at 616–17.
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2017) (limiting the holding to the
collection of IP addresses and stating a warrant was not required because the government did not
access the defendant’s communications).
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forensic analysis of bitcoin’s blockchain.225 While one may analogize the
government using computer software to analyze the blockchain to law
enforcement officers handling a thermal imaging device from outside a
person’s home to detect heat within the house, the reliance on that analogy
is misplaced because both concepts are fundamentally different.226 In Kyllo
v. United States,227 government agents suspected the defendant was growing
marijuana inside his home.228 The agents scanned the exterior of the
defendant’s home using a thermal imager to detect radiation consistent with
the use of high-intensity lamps for growing marijuana indoors.229
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated: “[O]btaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”230
The difference between the facts in Kyllo and the government’s use of
computer software to analyze the blockchain is that in the former, the
government is using technology not available to the general public to get a
peek inside a person’s home, a constitutionally protected area.231 The
Supreme Court has long recognized a person’s home is afforded the greatest
Fourth Amendment protection because it is one’s “most private space.”232
A home is an area that society as a whole would deem private because “[a]t
the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”233 Nevertheless,
225. See United States v. Norman, 448 F. App’x 895, 896 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (rejecting
defendant’s claim that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by using a specialized
software to view contents of a computer folder everyone in the peer-to-peer network had access to).
See generally Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 98 (holding the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
using pen registers to trap and trace IP addresses).
226. See Norman, 448 F. App’x at 896 (distinguishing a home from information shared with
others in a peer-to-peer network); Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 98 (contrasting software used to monitor a
person’s “IP address traffic through his router” which is not protected by the Fourth Amendment to
a thermal imager used from outside a person’s home, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment).
227. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
228. Id. at 29.
229. Id. at 30.
230. Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing people have a right against “unreasonable searches
and seizures” inside their homes); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (acknowledging a person’s home is a
constitutionally protected area).
232. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 474–75 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
233. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 626–30 (1886)).
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with regard to Bitcoin, the government is not using technology to take a
glimpse into one’s most private space. The government uses technology to
analyze Bitcoin’s public ledger, which is not constitutionally protected
because it is shared publicly on the Internet.234
By recognizing that people do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy for information available, directly and indirectly, through the Bitcoin
blockchain and IP address information, the Bitcoin blockchain further
enables government agents to crack down on crimes using cryptocurrencies
such as bitcoin. The government can trace blockchain and IP address
information without accessing an individual’s computer, which lessens the
likelihood of rummaging around in personal information.
The
government’s ability to analyze data and track IP addresses gives it a better
chance of obtaining information needed to establish probable cause to meet
the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirements. Changing this part
of the caselaw may adversely affect government agents from effectively
investigating crimes involving bitcoin, especially if the Legislature or courts
decide to impose stricter warrant requirements.
C. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to Bitcoin
Currently, government agents may obtain bitcoin evidence through third
parties.235 The Supreme Court established this third-party doctrine in
United States v. Miller236 and Smith v. Maryland.237 In Miller, the Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau (ATF) requested financial records from
banks holding the defendant’s financial accounts.238 The banks complied
with the request.239 The defendant moved to suppress the bank records
from being presented as evidence at trial.240 The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect the bank records because they are part of the
234. See United States v. Norman, 448 F. App’x 895, 897 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for information shared from the
defendant’s computer because it was available through a peer-to-peer network); cf. United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (stating there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a voice
recording because a “voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear”).
235. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting there is a
general consensus amongst federal courts indicating a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not
violated when ISPs provide subscriber information to the government).
236. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
237. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
238. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38.
239. Id. at 438.
240. Id.
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bank’s commercial records.241 The documents were not Miller’s private
papers.242 The Supreme Court stated:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.243

In Smith v. Maryland, a telephone company installed a pen register after
police, without a warrant, requested it to do so after a robbery victim began
receiving threatening phone calls from the alleged robber.244 The pen
register successfully identified the caller, and the defendant moved to
suppress any information obtained through the use of the pen register.245
The Supreme Court held the use of the pen register did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a number dialed on the telephone.246 The Court
reasoned there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for this information
because all telephone users know the phone numbers dialed are provided to
the phone companies to connect the calls.247 The Court also reasoned there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy because telephone users know
phone companies maintain a record of the phone calls for billing
purposes.248
Under current caselaw, subpoenaing third parties to provide information
on bitcoin users is possible. Government agents may subpoena ISPs or
bitcoin exchanges to provide certain disclosures. There is an old rule that
the government may compel others to disclose evidence they have within
their possession.249 While the government does not need to meet the

241. Id. at 444.
242. Id. at 440–41.
243. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745–52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
244. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
245. Id. at 735, 737.
246. Id. at 742.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2228 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements to obtain a subpoena, a
subpoena does not carry the same legal force as a warrant in allowing
government agents to search and seize.250 Someone who receives a
subpoena may object to the subpoena before complying, which adds a
safeguard to assist in mitigating the intrusion.251
In Part IV.B, I discussed how most circuit courts agree people do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for IP address information.
Because of the third-party doctrine, government agents may obtain IP
address information from ISPs.252 Similar to how people are associated
with telephone numbers or mailing addresses, every device connected to the
Internet is associated with a unique address known as an IP address.253 An
IP address is similar to a telephone number because it provides the identity
of the IP address’s owner; however, it does not reveal the actual contents of
the communication.254 If, while investigating a crime involving bitcoin, a
government successfully retrieves an IP address, the government may
request IP information from the ISP without a warrant.255 This concept is
true because the person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
for IP information, and a person knows this IP address information is
shared with ISPs so they may “make communication among electronic
devices possible.”256 Moreover, Internet users know they use third-party
equipment to communicate over the Internet.257 While one may argue
access to this information is an invasion of privacy because it allows for
government surveillance, the Supreme Court has not overruled the thirdparty doctrine as it relates to IP addresses.258
Applying the third-party doctrine, the government may obtain bitcoin
information by requesting information from bitcoin exchanges. People can
buy and sell bitcoins through specialized exchanges such as Bitstamp,

250. See id. (explaining the difference between a warrant and a subpoena).
251. Id. (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946)).
252. See cases cited supra note 200.
253. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2017).
254. Id. at 84; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
255. See Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 97 (discussing the investigator’s ability to obtain IP information
from an ISP without a warrant).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 96.
258. Id. at 96–97 (declining to deviate from the third-party doctrine because, in this specific
case, the government did not gain access to the actual contents of the computer by collecting IP address
information).
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Bitfinex, Coinbase, and several others.259 While specialized exchanges are
not banks, they are financial services companies, also known as Money
Services Businesses (MSBs), with money transmission licenses that require
them to comply with federal laws applicable to financial institutions.260
Exchanges are considered MSBs that are required to comply with federal
regulations because they engage in money transmission services. An MSB
engages in money transmission services by accepting “currency, funds, or
other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the
transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency
to another location or person by any means.”261
While exchanges are subject to various federal and state money
transmission regulations, some of “the most direct and effective regulations
relatable to the use of Bitcoin in the criminal enterprise are the federal Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money laundering (AML) statutes.”262 The
Bank Secrecy Act requires MSBs to verify customer identities, report
specific transactions, and retain records for up to five years.263 The USA
Patriot Act goes further to require MSBs to keep exhausted records and
maintain information regarding their customers’ identities.264 The purpose
of this record keeping is to ensure banks have a system in place to assist law
enforcement in deterring and detecting crimes through the misuse of
financial institutions.265
The reasoning in Miller is applicable when dealing with specialized
exchanges because Miller dealt with records that belonged to banks.266
Exchanges are not banks in the usual sense, but they are required to maintain
records just like banks. As such, people who go through specialized
exchanges voluntarily provide their information to exchanges, and the
259. See Prableen Bajpai, A Look at the Most Popular Bitcoin Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 16,
2019) https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/111914/look-most-popular-bitcoin-exchan
ges.asp [https://perma.cc/KSQ9-FQZN] (describing various bitcoin exchanges).
260. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, COINBASE, https://support.
coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2689172-coinbase-regulatory-compliance [https://perma
.cc/8KYP-9RF2] (listing statutes money services businesses must comply with).
261. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2014).
262. Lane, supra note 92, at 535 (footnotes omitted).
263. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, supra note 260.
264. Lane, supra note 92, at 536–37 (explaining the requirements of the USA Patriot Act).
265. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/index-bsa.html [https://perma.
cc/589D-UBRT].
266. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976) (concluding defendant did not
have a Fourth Amendment interest to dispute the subpoena of his bank records).
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government does not violate their Fourth Amendment right just because it
obtains information from the exchanges. For example, Coinbase discloses
to its customers that they must comply with various regulations, which
include verifying their identities and keeping records of it.267
V. WHY THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE CONTINUES
TO APPLY TO BITCOIN
The Supreme Court decided both Miller and Smith in the 1970s. To say
times have changed would be an understatement. Since the third-party
doctrine’s inception, the Court has consistently held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information shared with third parties.268 The
2018 landmark Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States finally put a
restriction on the doctrine.269 The Court held officers needed a search to
obtain historical cell phone location records from cell phone companies.270
The Court reasoned that cell phones pose a genuine privacy concern
because this would allow the government to track everyone’s movement.271
The Court was also careful in stating this was a narrow ruling and did not
change the third-party doctrine as it applied to most areas such as bank
records.272 There has been some discussion about reconsidering the thirdparty doctrine altogether. Justice Sotomayor has expressed that the thirdparty doctrine is unsuitable in this digital age because of the amount of
information people share with third parties during the ordinary course of
someone’s day.273
Since Carpenter, many defendants have moved to suppress evidence
obtained through third parties such as ISPs or bitcoin exchanges.274 In
Carpenter, the Supreme Court’s principal concern was with the government’s
seemingly limitless ability to track a person’s every movement through
historical cell site location information.275 The Court was also concerned
267. Coinbase Money Transmission and E-Money Regulatory Compliance, supra note 260.
268. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17, 2220 (2018) (declining to apply
the third-party doctrine).
269. See id. at 2220 (declining to apply Smith and Miller and thereby restricting the third-party
doctrine).
270. Id. at 2221.
271. Id. at 2217–18.
272. Id. at 2220.
273. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
274. See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to apply
Carpenter’s holding to IP address information).
275. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.
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with the government’s ability to “travel back in time” and track a person’s
life for the past five years.276 Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) raises
technology concerns that bitcoin does not. Cell phones are almost like an
appendage to the human body.277 People carry their phones with them
everywhere they go.278 The government’s access to this information
provides more than just their location; this access “provides an intimate
window into a person’s life.”279
There are several reasons why IP address information is fundamentally
different from CSLI. CSLI allows the government to treat cell phones like
GPS monitoring devices and enables the government to see a person’s every
move for up to five years, depending on the cell phone carrier’s retention
schedule.280 Second, cell phones ping location information to the nearest
cell phone tower without any voluntary action from the cell phone user.281
In contrast, an IP address is generated when a person makes the “affirmative
decision to access a website or application.”282 Third, while someone can
find a person’s location using an IP address, an additional process is needed
to find the location. When the government acquires the IP address, that
address does not contain the location, just numbers.283 CSLI reveals,
“without an independent investigation,” the cell phone user’s location.284
So long as IP addresses do not enable the government to track a person’s
every move, Carpenter should not apply.285 Again, the Supreme Court was
concerned with total surveillance.286 An IP address is like a phone number
or address. If the IP address information is used to only find the identity of

276. Id. at 2218.
277. Id.
278. See id. (analogizing a cell phone to an ankle monitor).
279. Id. at 2217.
280. See id. at 2217–18 (explaining the CSLI allows the government to trace a person’s
whereabouts and cellphones are comparable to GPS devices); see also United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d
87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Carpenter and holding that the CSLI and telephones essentially comprise a
GPS system that the government has access to).
281. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including
incoming calls, texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically
makes . . . .”).
282. Hood, 920 F.3d at 92.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (declining to
extend Carpenter to IP address information because the defendant failed to prove IP address
information enabled the government to track his daily movements).
286. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (expressing the concern of “near perfect” surveillance).
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individuals and does not allow the government to retrieve the actual
contents of the communication, then a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for IP address information.
Regarding bitcoin exchanges, fortunately, Carpenter did not affect Miller’s
holding. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court explicitly stated its decision does
not disrupt Miller.287 The Court deliberately chose not to address “business
records that might incidentally reveal location information.”288 While
bitcoin exchanges are not financial institutions in the usual sense, the
government does not treat them differently from other financial institutions
by imposing federal laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite living in a digital world, the third-party doctrine should be
preserved and only limited on a case-by-case basis. The third-party doctrine
allows the government to keep up with criminals. Without this legal
principle, the government would need to rely on the Legislature to enact
laws that assist them in finding criminals. It is imperative to recognize the
Supreme Court was deliberate in limiting their holding to CSLI.
Furthermore, with CSLI, the government knows the identity of the
person it wants the CSLI from. It makes sense to require a warrant to obtain
historical location information because the government should demonstrate
they have probable cause in believing a crime was committed or is in the
process of being committed. On the other hand, concerning bitcoin,
without the third-party doctrine, the government’s ability to find a criminal
is severely hindered because the government relies on IP information to
discover a criminal’s identity. Sophisticated criminals find ways to hide their
identities, and statutes or caselaw should not restrict the government from
using IP address information to assist it in finding them. IP address
information allows government agents to find suspects and get the probable
cause needed to obtain a warrant. If the Legislature or courts impose stricter
warrant requirements in the future, the government’s need for IP address
information is even greater. If the information is limited to discovering the
person’s identity behind the IP address, there should not be a strong privacy
concern.
While I am concerned IP address information may one day reveal
extensive location data similar to CSLI, I also believe we must remember
287. Id. at 2220.
288. Id. at 2210.
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what is at the core of the Fourth Amendment, protection against unreasonable
Concerning bitcoin, when determining whether the
searches.289
government violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment right, courts
should assess the government’s reasonableness by weighing the
government’s great interest with the defendant’s lessened (or nonexistent)
privacy interests.290 Considering how criminals are using digital currencies
to fund crimes and how difficult it is to find a criminal’s identity when using
bitcoin, it is imperative the third party is preserved and only limited on a
case-by-case basis.

289. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960)).
290. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461 (2013) (“The reasonableness of any search
much be considered in the context of the person’s legitimate expectations of privacy.”) (emphasis added).
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